There has been increasing interest in the potential of blockchain in enhancing the security of devices and systems, such as Internet of Things (IoT). In this paper, we present a blockchain-based IoT security architecture, IoTchain. The three-tier architecture comprises an authentication layer, a blockchain layer and an application layer, and is designed to achieve identity authentication, access control, privacy protection, lightweight feature, regional node fault tolerance, denial-of-service resilience, and storage integrity. We also evaluate the performance of IoTchain to demonstrate its utility in an IoT deployment.
Introduction
Internet of Things (IoT) and embedded devices are fast becoming a norm in our society for both civilian application (e.g. smart cities and smart homes) and military application (e.g. Internet of Battlefield Things and Internet of Military Things) [1, 2, 3, 4] . Similar to other popular information and communications technologies, security and privacy issues are two key considerations and these are active and ongoing research areas. For example, Qi Jing et al. [5] surveyed cross-layer heterogeneous integration challenges associated with IoT systems. Weber [6] also briefly described several security and privacy properties that should be considered in an IoT system, namely: resilience to denial of service (DoS) attacks, data authentication, access control and client privacy. There have also been other surveys and reviews on different aspects of IoT security and privacy, such as [7, 8, 9] .
There has been recent interest in the use of blockchain in achieving security and privacy properties more efficiently.
Since the introduction of blockchain in the paper entitled 'Bitcoin: A Peerto-Peer Electronic Cash System' [10] to solve the double-spending problem in 2008, blockchain has opened the door to many opportunities far beyond the initial application as a foundational element of digital currencies [11] . Specifically, blockchain technology has the properties of being completely distributed, autonomous, restricted to following contractual code and being trackable.
1. Distributed: Each node can obtain all blocks in the chain simply by connecting to the neighboring node. Therefore, everyone in the network has a copy of the blockchain. The public distribution of the complete, intact blockchain also precludes any attempt to defraud or contaminate the transaction through the mechanisms of double spending or replaying a duplicate transaction.
2. Autonomous: Blockchain network system is an open platform that anyone can participate in the blockchain network without registration or being authenticated to serve as a node, and/or withdraw from the network at will.
3. Contractual: All nodes should act in accordance to the rule to reach a consensus.
Trackable:
This property is useful in that any transaction is immutable and cannot be altered once the transaction has been completed and added to the blockchain.
However, blockchain implementation can be resource-consuming (e.g. high bandwidth and delays) and hence may not be suited for IoT applications [12, 13] . A blockchain-based IoT update operation to achieve improved availability and accountability was proposed in [14] . However, blockchain was only used during the update of device software. We posit that blockchain could play a more significant role in IoT security and privacy solutions.
In this paper, we present a blockchain-based architecture for IoT security (hereafter referred to as IoTchain). There are three tiers in the proposed architecture, namely: authentication layer, blockchain layer, and application layer. The architecture is designed to achieve identity authentication, access control, privacy protection, lightweight feature, fault tolerance, DoS attack resilience, and storage integrity, without incurring high overheads and delays.
In the next section, we will present the background materials. In Section 3, we present our proposed architecture. The core protocols, building blocks of the architecture, are presented in Section 4. In Section 5, we present the analysis and evaluation of the proposal. Finally, Section 6 concludes this paper.
Preliminaries
In this section, we will introduce the hardware security module (HSM), Merkle tree and security properties.
Hardware security module
HSM is a dedicated encryption processor designed specifically to protect the encryption key (i.e. manages, processes, and saves encryption keys safely in reliable and tamper-resistant devices) [15] . Each module contains one or more secure cryptoprocessor chips [16] to prevent tampering and bus probing. Many HSM systems also have the means to securely backup keys that they handle, either in a wrapped form via the computer operating system or externally using a smartcard or some other security token. For example, in a public key infrastructure (PKI) environment, certification authorities and registration authorities may use HSMs to generate, store, and handle key pairs.
Merkle tree
Merkle tree is also known as the hash tree which stores hash values [17, 18] . Merkle tree has been used in Bitcoin [10] , where the leaves are hash values of data blocks (such as files) and a non-leaf node is the hash of its corresponding child node concatenation string.
Merkle tree is also used for comparison and verification, as it significantly reduces the amount of data needed to be transferred and the computational complexity when dealing with matching or validated application scenarios, especially in a distributed environment. Figure 1 is an example of a merkle tree. Each leaf node has the authentication path information, and the four leaf nodes are the hash values of the respective transactions. The internal nodes are generated from child nodes, such as H ab = Hash(H a + H b ), and merkle root = H abcd = Hash(H ab + H cd ). Each leaf node can be verified via the merkle root and the authentication path information. Verifier always keeps merkle root. Prover wants to prove to verifier that T xa really exists, it only needs to send merkle root H abcd , API (H b , H cd ) and T xa to verifier, and then the verifier calculates H ab = Hash(H a + H b ) and H abcd = Hash(H ab + H cd ). Verifier compares the calculated merkle root with the merkle root saved by himself, if they are equal, the verifier acknowledges the transaction does exist.
Security properties
Based on existing research [13, 14, 12, 19] , the following security properties that are particularly relevant for IoT systems are as follows. DoS attack resilience. DoS attacks, also known as flood attacks, attempt to exhaust the available resources of targeted networks or systems (including IoT Figure 1 : Merkle tree structure systems), which resulting in the disruption of the targeted service(s) [20, 21, 22, 23] . In other words, such attacks typically affect availability in the conventional CIA (confidentiality, integrity and availability) triad. For example, an external attacker can launch DoS attacks to attack an intermediary IoT node (e.g. the regional node in our proposed architecture -see Section 3) to paralyze the blockchain network.
Malicious regional node attack resilience. Certain IoT nodes, such as regional nodes in our proposed architecture, may be under the control of a third party. Such nodes may be malicious, in the sense that these nodes may attempt to insert malicious transactions or modify existing transactions. For example, an attacker may wish to allow malicious IoT devices to collect and send information to another device under the control of the attacker, without the user's knowledge (e.g. a smart TV to collect sound and videos without the authorization of the owner).
Identity forgery attack resilience. An attacker may forge the signature of the device in order to successfully construct a malicious transaction to facilitate other malicious activities (e.g. data exfiltration such as those discussed in [24, 25, 26] ).
Malicious cloud service provider attack resilience. Malicious cloud service providers (or their employees) may process the stored data without permission, such as addition, deletion or modification. Also, a malicious cloud service provider may intentionally calculate the wrong result for the requester.
Malicious manufacturer attack resilience. The IoT manufacturer may insert backdoors in devices (also known as hardware Trojans) or software for malicious purpose.
Proposed architecture
We will now introduce our proposed IoTchain architecture, as depicted in Figures 2 and 3 . For the remaining of this paper, we will denote the certification center as CC, detection center as DC, regional node as RN, manufacturer as M and device as D. The interactive information flow is referred to as transaction, so as to be consistent with the Bitcoin protocol.
The certification layer is where the certification center and the detection center are located. In practice, both centers can be the same physical entity.
• The certification center certifies the manufacturer and the regional center, which is conceptually similar to Internet Assigned Numbers Authority allocating IP addresses. It has its own key pair (pk cc , sk cc ).
• The detection center is used to detect malicious behaviors. For example, the detection center can detect whether the software update/patch released by the manufacturer is secure (e.g. in the event that update is injected by a third party), or whether the cloud service provider modifies the data uploaded by the device.
In the application layer, we have regional nodes that are conceptually similar to a miner in Bitcoin. The regional node is also responsible for the management of devices in the entire region and has significant computing power and storage capacities. The regional node has a public/private key pair (pk rn , sk rn ). The consensus algorithm between regional nodes is based on the actual demand, and it should be sufficiently lightweight (unlike to energy-consuming consensus mechanism in [10] ). One candidate we consider in IoTchain is the Byzantine fault-tolerant algorithm and more specifically, the Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance algorithm (PBFT) [27] . The PBFT algorithm is used in Fabric [28] , and has a 1/3 node-level fault tolerance. Other potential consensus mechanisms include proof-of-stake [29] . In other words, any efficient and lightweight consensus algorithm can be used in IoTchain, based on the actual needs. The RN stores a range of transactional information. In addition to storing the public key information of the certified manufacturers and other regional nodes, each regional node maintains four tables, namely:
• The registry table includes device's registration information.
• The update table includes the update information from the manufacturer.
• The permissions table includes permission release information.
• The storage information table stores the data of the device storage information. The blockchain layer provides blockchain services in the IoT implementation. Specifically, it accepts transactional information from the application layer, and provides two modes for the user to choose. This will be discussed further in Section 4.
• The service usage layer uses the services provided by the service provider layer.
-Users use IoT devices for various purpose, such as healthcare related (e.g. heart rate measurement and step counts), and these devices may need to be registered with a regional network (e.g. a regional clinic or hospital).
-Let the device number be denoted as i, and each device has a public/private key pair (pk di , sk di ). The manufacturer generates the device's certificate cert di = (pk di , sign mj (pk di )), where Sign mj (pk di ) is the signature of pk di signed using the private key M j . The manufacturer then writes tuple = (pk di , sk di , cert di ) on the HSM during the manufacturing stage.
• The service provider layer provides local storage service and cloud service to devices. In order for efficient storage, the device can store the data in local storage (i.e. does not involve the blockchain network). The device can also store the data in the cloud, based on demand. Let the manufacturer number be denoted as j, and the manufacturer produces the IoT devices and perform the necessary authentication operation for the devices. In our proposed IoTchain, there are multiple competing manufacturers, M ={m 1 , ..., m m }, where m is the number of manufacturers, and the public and private keys of M j are pk 
Core protocols
In this section, we will describe the core protocols in our IoTchain architecture, namely: registration and cancellation transactions, update release and query transactions, device storage transactions, permission release and request transactions, and local interactive transactions. Transactions that are not written to the blockchain network directly will be processed via the merkle tree to construct a local transaction (see Section 4.5).
Registration and cancellation transaction
All entities in IoTchain need to be authenticated. Thus, we now describe the registration and cancellation transaction protocol. For manufacturer and regional node: Both manufacturer and regional node generate a registration request and send the registration request to a certification center. Then, the certification center reviews to determine whether the registration request meets the requirement. If it does, then the corresponding key pair is sent back to the applicant and the registration transaction will be generated by the certification center. Then, the certification center will send this to the blockchain network. Upon confirmation, the entire registration process is completed -see Figure 4 .
For device: During manufacturing, tuple = (pk di , sk di , cert di ) is written on the HSM to prevent attackers from tampering with information. The structure of registration transactions for device is shown in Table 1 , which will be sent by the device to the regional network to complete the registration.
For cloud service provider: The cloud service provider sends a registration request to the regional network, and obtains the authentication released by the regional network. Then, the regional network writes the transaction into the registry table.
All the above-mentioned transactions are for registrations. When it comes to cancellation, a typical case is that an entity will be removed from the system once the validity period expires. Another event for cancellation is when the detection center detects a malicious regional node or manufacturer. When this happens, the detection center will construct a cancellation transaction to remove the malicious regional node or manufacturer.
Types
Registration transaction Related description information
Public key information
Signature Registration Version number, manufacturer etc.
Signm j Table 1 : The structure of a registration transaction 
Update release and query transactions
This protocol allows the manufacturer to apply security or software updates (patches), and these update release and query transactions are via blockchain.
Update release transaction IoTchain offers two ways.
1. When a manufacturer wishes to apply a software update to large-scale regions or globally, then the update transaction should be issued directly to the blockchain network. The regional node generates an update table for the respective devices. The structure of a update release transaction is shown in Table 2 , and the process is shown in Figure 5 .
2. If the device update is limited to some region(s), then the update transaction is sent to the specific regional node where devices need to be updated. This can result in reduced overheads in the network.
Update query transaction The device can periodically construct an update query transaction to ask whether an update is required. The regional node searches the update table to find the answer. If it exists, then it transfers the update contents to the device. The device will verify the transaction signature, and if the signature is correct and the data is complete, then the device will be updated.
Update detection The detection center will carry out malicious code detection of the device update contents in the blockchain layer. If malicious codes are identified, then the detection center will contact the corresponding manufacturer for further investigation, and if necessary, the detection center can cancel the certification of the malicious manufacturer. 
Device storage transaction
When the built-in storage capacity of device is not sufficient and more data needs to be stored, then the data will be uploaded to a local regional storage node or cloud service provider.
Upload to local storage The device uploads data directly to the local regional storage node. Upload to cloud service providers The device uploads data to the cloud service providers directly, generates the hash of data, and constructs the storage information transactions. The device will also use its own private key sk di to sign this transaction and send it to the blockchain network. After the blockchain network has confirmed receipt, the cloud service provider stores the data. The cloud service provider not only has the storage capacity, but it also has the ability to analyze and process the outsourced data. The structure of the device storage transaction to the cloud service provider is shown in Table 3 , and the process is shown in Figure 6 . 
Permission release and request transactions
In our proposed IoTchain, we also consider access control. For example, a user's wearable device wishes to access some services (e.g. opens the door), the device will invoke the permission release transactions. For explanation, we assume that the user has two devices D 1 , D 2 and wishes D 1 to obtain access to D 2 .
Figure 6: The process of a device storage transaction
Permission release transaction 1. Permission release between devices in the same region: users can use device identification number to set the access rights of the two devices in the regional node, and add the permission content in the permission table.
2. Permission release between devices in different regional nodes: first, the regional node RN 1 generates the permission transaction and signs it, then RN 1 sends it to RN 2 . RN 2 signs it and sends it to the blockchain network. The structure of permission release transaction is shown in Table 4 .
Permission request transaction 1. Permission request between devices in the same region: locally, D 1 constructs permission request transaction and sends it to the regional node. The regional node queries its permission table. If they align with each other, then D 1 is allowed to access D 2 and both D 1 and D 2 will be assigned with a shared symmetric key for communication.
2. Permission request between devices in different regional nodes: D 1 constructs permission request transaction and sends it to its regional node. Then, the regional node queries its own permission table and checks whether the request device D 2 is in the region under RN 2 . If so, RN 1 signs the request transaction and sends it to RN 2 . Upon confirmation of RN 2 and the signature with sk rn2 verifies, then the permission request transaction will be published to the blockchain network. The communication key will also be generated. Once D 1 and D 2 receive the key, they establish their communication and use the key to encrypt future data transmission. The request process from D 1 to D 2 is shown in Figure 7 .
When D 1 needs to request local storage and cloud service, it needs to obtain the hash value of the required data from the blockchain network to ensure integrity. The steps are the same as the process in requesting of device data. 
Local interactive transaction
Based on the IoTchain architecture and the above discussed transactions, it is clear which transactions are directly written into the blockchain network and which transactions are written into the merkle tree first -see also Table 5 . For transactions that do need to be sent to the blockchain network directly, the regional node will compute the hash value as the leaf nodes of the transaction in order to construct a merkle tree. The regional node uses the merkle root to construct a local interactive transaction, and publishes it into the blockchain network. Meanwhile, it will return the authentication path information to the applicant who requests the leaf node transaction.
Once the transaction applicants wish to confirm the completed transactions, the task can be achieved easily by using the authentication path information and the merkle root value. If the value computed by verifier matches with the merkle root value stored locally, then this indicates the existence of the local transaction.
Written into the blockchain network directly
Written into the blockchain network via merkle tree 
Security analysis and performance evaluation
This section presents the security analysis and performance evaluation of our proposal.
Security analysis
We will now explain how our proposal achieves the security properties described in Section 2.3. DoS attacks. DoS attacks in the blockchain layer cannot succeed due to the distributed structure of blockchain. The blockchain has no single point of failure problem.
Malicious regional node attacks. The regional nodes wish to add malicious transactions to the blockchain network. Such an attack will not be successful because the signature cannot be forged assuming the security of the underlying digital signature algorithm. When a regional node is always rejecting normal (i.e. non malicious) transactions, then the user can report it to the detection center after discovering the situation. Upon investigation, the detection center may decide to cancel the certification of the misbehaving regional node.
Identity forgery attacks. An external attacker wishes to use a fabricated signature of a device to construct a transaction. Similarly, due to the use of a secure digital signature algorithm, such an attack will not work. Another possibility is to create a device with malicious codes. However, such a device will not be registered in advance by the manufacturers; thus, devices produced by an attacker will not be able to obtain a legitimate public and private key pair.
Malicious cloud service provider attacks. Malicious cloud service provider may perform unauthorized operations over the stored data, such as adding, deleting, modifying and querying. A user can perform a hash value comparison (i.e. compare the hash of the data stored by the cloud service provider with the hash value stored in the blockchain network). In other words, data modification can be easily detected.
Malicious manufacturer attacks. Manufacturers can include a back door in the device or software, for nefarious purpose. We assume that a competent detection center will diligently check the software updates published in the blockchain network to identify such back doors or vulnerabilities. Once detected, the certification center will withdraw the qualification of the particular manufacturer and revoke the corresponding public and private key pair.
Property analysis
We will now discuss the properties of IoTchain (also see Table 6 ).
Identity authentication. [30] Entities in IoTchain should have their own public/private key pairs. If either party (e.g. manufacturer or regional node) misbehaves, then the detection center can cancel their qualification by issuing a cancellation transaction. The device has a built-in public and private key, and the public key represents its identity. Thus, IoTchain guarantees the identity of the entity.
Access control. [31]
The process of releasing and requesting permission was discussed in Section 4.4. The permission table maintained by the regional node provides fine-grained access control for users and devices.
Privacy protection. Blockchain provides a global transparent service. Thus, the privacy of Iotchain system cannot be guaranteed. However, it can be solved by the use of merkle tree, in the sense that the data that are meant to be private will not be sent to blockchain directly. In other words, IoTchain offers two modes to handle transactions.
1. Primitive mode: Regional nodes receive a range of transaction information and put them into blockchain network directly. The associated limitation is the demands imposed on the communication, although the transaction information is globally visible, tamper-resistant and its distributed storage cannot be affected by a single point failure. The latter three characteristics are probably why blockchain are being currently explored for a wide range of applications.
2. Merkle mode: Regional nodes save the received transaction information locally. After all the data have been processed by the merkle tree, the regional node publishes the root of the merkle tree to the blockchain network. A key disadvantage is that function is concentrated in the regional node (i.e. potentially a single point of failure), and if the information is lost, then all information will be lost (i.e. no redundancy). The key advantage is in its privacy protection, in the sense that the transaction information is seen only by the regional node.
Lightweight feature. IoTchain takes the IoT device's constraints (i.e. computing power and bandwidth capacity) into account and places the most computationally and storage intensive activities at the blockchain layer. Ordinary device only needs to perform lightweight transactions, as IoTchain transfers a large number of sensor tasks to the regional nodes; thus, providing an alternative transaction mode and enabling lightweightness.
Regional node fault tolerance. IoTchain allows different consensus algorithms to be used (e.g. plug-and-play) to meet the needs of the market at any one time. For example, we discussed the use of the PBFT algorithm because it can support 1/3 of the nodes' fault tolerance. Thus, IoTchian has a high fault tolerance. Other fault tolerance consensus mechanisms can also be deployed according to specific requirements.
DoS resilience. Although we cannot prevent an attacker from targeting the manufacturers (or any systems and entities, including government and national security agencies), once the manufacturer uploads the update transaction to the blockchain network, the update contents are DoS resilience (due to the inherent property of blockchain). In other words, any attacker cannot prevent the device from obtaining updated content from the blockchain network.
Storage integrity guarantee. Device publishes the hash of the data to blockchain network. The hash value in blockchain cannot be tampered due to the tamper-resistant characteristics. Thus, anyone can check whether the information stored in the cloud server is complete. The local memory is stored locally, so its integrity is guaranteed. IoTchain uses the hash of data to guarantee integrity Table 6 : IoTchain property analysis
Performance evaluation
In this section, we simulate the communications between device and regional node, and between regional nodes in the blockchain layer.
Communications between device and regional node
We built a network of IoTchain environment based on contiki 2.7 [32] . We constructed six Z1 mote nodes generated at random locations and assumed that one of the nodes is a regional node. The nodes used IPV6 over low power wireless personal regional networks (6LoWPAN) to connect with each other, typical of resource constrained wireless sensor networks. In this simulation/evaluation, we only considered the communication process (i.e. computation and storage procedures were not considered). We also assumed the use of the elliptic curve signature algorithm [33] in our scheme, and thus, we used 72 bytes for the signature sizes in the simulations.
The hash function is SHA-256 [34] in the simulation, so the hash of data is 32 bytes.
The size of the registration transaction takes types, description, public key information and signature into account, and adds up to a total of 79 bytes. The update release transaction takes 77 bytes without the update data. The update query transaction is 5 bytes which is 72 bytes less than the update release transaction because of the signature sizes. Permission release transaction needs 10 bytes to offer types, devices information and types of operation. It takes 82 bytes to construct a permission request transaction. The size of each transaction via the merkle tree is shown in Figure 8 .
We used contiki 2.7 to simulate the communicationa between device and RN. It takes 151 ms for device to perform a registration transaction. Update release and update query transaction take 147 ms and 81 ms, respectively. Permission release and request transaction cost 94 ms and 152 ms, respectively. Each transmission time is shown in Figure 9 .
As shown in the simulations, the communication time between device and the regional node adds 72 bytes of signature, and an additional of 32 bytes of hash value is required to guarantee security. 
Communications between regional nodes
As the regional nodes have more computing power and storage capacity, we used Fabric [28] to simulate the communications between region nodes.
The size of the registration transaction for the manufacturer or the regional node is 80 bytes. The update release transaction (partly) takes the same 77 bytes with global update release transaction. The device storage transaction needs 112 bytes as it contains a hash value of 32 bytes and a signature of 72 bytes. Permission release and request transaction require 154 bytes each, because they need two signatures of the regional node. The size of each transaction written into blockchain directly is shown in Figure 10 .
In [35] , the authors deployed the IOHeavy smart contract that performs a number of read and write operations of key-value tuples. They used 20-byte keys and 100-byte values. This environment is exactly the same as the communications between the regional nodes in the blockchain layer. The average time of writing is about 5106 ms and read time is about 8703 ms. It can be seen that the writing and reading time are not affected by an increase in block sizes. The simulation is shown in Figure 11 .
As shown in the simulations, the transmission times can be realistically realized in the blockchain layer. 
Conclusion
IoT and blockchains are two technological trends that are likely to stay for the foreseeable future, and blockchain can be used to enhance the security of IoT systems.
In this paper, we presented a blockchain-based IoT security architecture, IoTchain. We then demonstrated how this three-tier architecture achieves identity authentication, access control, privacy protection, lightweight feature, regional node fault tolerance, DoS resilience, and storage integrity. We then demonstrated that IoTchain traffic is sufficiently low for a real-world deployment.
Future research will include implementing a prototype of IoTchain in a realworld environment, such as in the IoT labs of the authors. This will allow us to empirically evaluate the proposed architecture in a real-world setting.
